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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
NORMA CAMPBELL, LAMONT CAMPBELL,
and THE CAMPBELL CATTLE COMPANY,
a Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs/Appellees
vs.

Case No-

970587-CA

BOX ELDER COUNTY,

Priority No.

15

Defendant/Appellant
BOX ELDER COUNTY,
Third Party Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
NORMA CAMPBELL, LAMONT CAMPBELL,
THE CAMPBELL CATTLE COMPANY, a
Utah general partnership, PAUL D.
BARNES, EVELYN BARNES, COLEEN
BARNES, ELDON M. BARNES, WANDA
BARNES, BURKE HEATON, and THE
HEATON LIMITED FAMILY PARTNERSHIP,
Third Party Defendants/Appellees.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
POINT I
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY RULED THAT
THESE STATUTES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.

POINT II
THE "DEDICATION BY USE" STATUTES, SECTION
27-12-89 AND 90, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, DO NOT
EFFECT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING VIOLATING
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

RECITATION OF THE STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 27-12-89:
"Pubiic use constituting dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period
of ten years .ft
Section 27-12-90:
"Highways Once Established Continue Until Abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to
be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having such jurisdiction over any
such highway, or by other competent authority."
Section 27-12-2(6):
"Highway means any public road, street, alley, lane,
court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or
structure laid out or erected for public use, or
dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in
an action for the partition of real property, including
the entire area within the right-of-way."
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NATURE OF THE CASE
Prior to the trial court's final decision, Judge Hadfield
entered an Order Denying Appellees' Request for Partial Summary
Judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of the two
statutes in question.

Record, Pages 164-175.

Appellees raised

the issue on appeal in their brief.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision denying
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Record, Pages 164-175.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
See the earlier briefs filed by Appellant and Appellees.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

This Court has already ruled on this issue in a 1996

case (Kohler v. Martin), finding a claim of unconstitutionality
to be without merit.
2.

Statutes are presumed to be valid.

These statutes do

not constitute or cause any taking or regulation which is
compensable under either the U.S. or Utah Constitutions.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY RULED THAT
THESE STATUTES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
In Kohler v. Martin, 916 P2d 910 (Utah App. 1996), this
Court decided the very issue raised by Appellees in their Reply
Brief.
In Kohler, two private parties were disputing the use and
ownership of a driveway.
The trial court found that the driveway was actually
included in a roadway which was in turn a public thoroughiare.
The trial court also made rulings regarding the existence of a
private prescriptive easement.
On appeal, numerous issues were raised for review, but the
Appellate Court only reached two of those issues, those being (1)
whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the roadway
was a public thoroughfare pursuant to Section 27-12-89, and (2)
whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the entire
parcel of property involved had been dedicated to the public.
The Appellate Court ruled that the trial court properly
concluded a public roadway had been created pursuant to said
statute, reversed the trial court concerning the existence of
private easements, then remanded for a determination of the
necessary and reasonable width of the public roadway.
One of the issues raised in Martin concerned the
constitutionality of Section 27-12-89.

In a footnote, on Page

912 of the opinion, the Court stated as follows:

4

"We do not address Martin's arguments regarding joinder
and the alleged violation of Article I, Section 22 of
the Utah Constitution. Martin has not demonstrated
that the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to grant the motion for joinder of Midway City.
Further, the argument regarding the unconstitutional
taking is entirely without merit and need not be
addressed." (Kohler, Page 912, Footnote #1; emphasis
added.)

Appellees raised the same issue in the instant case,
although they additionally challenged the constitutionality of
said Section 27-12-90.

However, the basis for the challenge is

the same, and Appellees make no distinction between the two
statutes.

Therefore, if Section 27-12-89 is constitutional, so

is Section 27-12-90.
Appellees' challenge is raised under the same Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution dealt with summarily in
Martin.

Admittedly, Appellees also raise the challenge under the

Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but the issue is the
same, and the language of the two constitutional provisions is
virtually the same.
Appellees dismiss the Kohler v. Martin opinion as
"unhelpful" because there is no discussion of the merits of the
constitutional argument or the manner in which it was raised.
It is respectfully submitted that exactly the opposite is
true; the issue is so obviously without merit that no discussion
need even occur.
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POINT II
THE "DEDICATION BY USE" STATUTES, SECTION
27-12-89 AND 90, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, DO NOT
EFFECT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING VIOLATING
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTTCLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

Section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code, which appears in a
chapter of the Utah Code entitled "Acquisition of Property for
Highway Purposes", provides as follows:
"Public use constituting dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public tlior oughlaie lor a per tod
of ten years.,f
Section 27-12-90 provides as follows:
"Highways Once Established Continue Until Abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to
be highways until abandoned or vacated border of the
highway authorities having such jurisdiction over any
such highway, or by other competent authority."
The word "highway" is defined in Section 27-12-2(6) as
follows:
"Highway means any public road, street, alley, lane,
court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or
structure laid out or erected for public use, or
dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in
an action for the partition of real property, including
the entire area within the right-of-way."
In determining whether or not a Utah statute is
constitutional, Utah law on the subject is certainly the
appropriate beginning point.

Utah cases that discuss the

constitutionality of statutes read as follows: "[t]he act is
presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality."

Society of Separationists, Inc. vs.

Whitehead, 870 P2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) quoting from In re
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Criminal Investigation, 754 P2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988); "statutes
are presumed to be constitutional, and will not be invalidated
if, resolving every reasonable doubt in favor of their
constitutionality, there is any reasonable basis upon which they
can be sustained."

Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P2d 674, 699 (Utah

±982); "[i]t is a well established rule of constitutional law
that where there are two alternatives as to the interpretation of
a statute, one of which would make its constitutionality doubtful
and the other would render it constitutional, the latter will
prevail-"

Id.; "all doubts must be resolved in favor of

constitutionality, and the Court is obligated to adopt any
reasonable construction of a statute that will assure it's
constitutionality in preference to any construction that would
jeopardize it."

Id.; "[t]he primary rule of statutory

interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991); "it is the wellestablished rule that legislative enactments are endowed with a
strong presumption of validity; and that they should not be
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon
which they can be found to come within the constitutional
framework; and that a statute will not be stricken down as being
unconstitutional unless it appears to be so beyond a reasonable
doubt."

Greaves v. State, 528 P2d 805, 806 (Utah 1974); "statute

will not be declared unconstitutional... if under any sensible
interpretation of its language it can be given practical effect."
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Id.;

,f

[a] statute is presumed constitutional, and 'we resolve any

reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.f»

Board of

Com'rs, Utah State Bar vs. Petersen, 937 P2d 1263, 1267 (Utah
L997) .
The District Court denied the Appellee landowner's motion
for summary judgment on the constitutionality/takings issue and
granted the Appellant County f s cross-motion for summary judgment
on the same issue on February 13, 1997.

Record 164-75.

Appellee

misunderstands the statutes regarding the character of the
governmental action by describing it as being a permanent
physical, occupation of properly by the government.

it was the

public that continuously used the road for ten years or more as a
public thoroughfare.

That fact, and that fact alone, caused the

invocation of Sections 27-12-89 and 90, Utah Code Annotated, with
the result being a highway deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public.

The highway has been

dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public due to
circumstances, and the passage of time, not because of some
governmental action.

Moreover, the property in guestion has been

used as a road for several decades and its general shape and
appearance has remained the same during that time period.

The

act that brought this lawsuit was the gating of the road in 1997
by Appellees.
The challenged statutes do not constitute regulation or
taking which is compensable.

See Colman vs. Utali State Land

Board, 795 P2d 622 (Utah, 1990).
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In Colman, the plaintiff owned and operated a mineral
extraction business utilizing brine from the Great Salt Lake, and
in connection with the business owned an easement to operate an
underwater brine canal parallel to the Great Salt Lake causeway.
The State breached the causeway during the flooding in 1984,
and Colman1s claim for damages arising from that action was
dismissed at the trial court level.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed, among other
things, the issues of whether or not Colman had a protected
property interest and whether it was either taken or damaged
within the meaning of Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution, which provides as follows:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation."
The Court also examined whether or not the doctrine of
sovereign immunity barred ColmanTs suit, in the absence of formal
condemnation proceedings.
The Supreme Court found that Colmanfs lease and easement
were indeed recognized property interests, and were protected
under the applicable constitutional provision.

The Court then

discussed whether or not that interest was either "taken" or
"damaged" within the meaning of the just compensation clause.
The Court defined a taking as "any substantial interference
with private property which destroys or materially lessens its
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed."
Page 6 26).

9

(Colman at

The Court defined damage as "definite physical injury
cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present
market value."

(Colman at Page 626).

Regarding damages, the Court furthpr stated:
"Damages to land, by the construction of a pubJic or
industrial improvement, though no part thereof is taken
as provided for under 78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule
for severance damages, is limited to injuries that
would be actionable at common law, or where there has
been some physical disturbance of a right, either
public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection
with his property and which gives it additional value,
and which causes him to sustain a special damage with
respect to his property in excess of that sustained by
the public generally." (Colman at Page 626).
The Colman court also tilled that regardless of whether or
not property was taken through eminent domain or "merely
regulated" under the State's police powers, Colman possessed a
just compensation claim under Article 1, Section 22.

The Court

stated:
"Rather, the issue is whether sufficient facts were
alleged to show a taking of property." (Colman at Page
628) .
The challenged code sections, as noted above, are not
regulatory; no government action is involved.
themselves created the road.

Appellees

The event or events which caused

the road to become public was public usage coupled with the
passage of time.
Furthermore, since the landowners themse]ves created and use
these roads, as Appellees established at trial, by no stretch of
the imagination can public use destroy or materiaJly lessen the
value of the road property itself, nor is the owner's right to
use of and enjoyment of the roads abridged or destroyed.
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Appellees cannot demonstrate any definite physical injury
cognizable to the senses; the road was there during the ten-year
statutory period, and remains afterward, in the same location,
with the same width.
No severance damages are allowable under Colman, so the
issue is limited to damages to the roadway property itself.

A

roadway is not damaged by leaving it a roadway; if nothing is
changed, no damage is possible.
Furthermore, the public trust doctrine prohibits the
awarding of any compensation.
In

Colman the Court discussed, beginning at Page 635, the

so-called public trust doctrine.
At trial, the State argued, and the trial court held, that
the breaching of the causeway was in furtherance of the State's
public trust responsibilities and therefore the State could not
be liable for the damage done to Colmanfs canal.

The State

maintained that it could take any action relating to the Great
Salt Lake that was in the public interest and be immune from
liability, while Colman argued that the public trust doctrine did
not apply to flood control, but only to other things such as
recreational use and preservation of ecological .integrity.
The Supreme Court remanded this issue, stating that it was a
question of fact to be decided by the trial court, since the
State had exercised its public trust powers in leasing the canal
to Colman, and thereafter attempted to revoke that grant without
compensation.
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In a subsequent case, National Parks and Conservation
Association vs. Board of State Lands, 869 P2d 909 (Utah 1993),
the Supreme Court, at Page 919, clarified the Colman case
further, stating:
"The 'public trust1 doctrine discussed in Colman vs.
Utah State Land Board, 795 P2d 622, 635-36 (Utah 1990),
protects the ecological integrity of public lands and
their public recreational uses for the benefit of the
public at large. The public trust doctrine, however,
is limited to sovereign lands and perhaps other State
lands that are not subject to specific trusts, such as
school trust lands. (Citations omitted) Thus, the
beneficiaries and the purposes of the public trust and
the school land trust are different."
The essence of the instant case is that the roadways in
question lead to public land, which is used mostly for
recreational uses, particularly hunting.
It is respectfully submitted that the public trust doctrine
includes or should include federal public lands within the State
which are available for public recreational purposes, and
therefore no damages may be awarded.
There is no protected property interest.

The roads involved

in this case were created by the property owners, for their own
u^e and benefit, and continue to be used for such purposes.
There is no government action, regulation, statute, or any
government sponsored event giving rise to the alleged taking.
The situation is simply a matter of the public driving on roads
created by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' lack of diligence in

preventing public access and the public's use of the roadways do
not constitute any sort of governmental action as contemplated by
federal case law, the Utah Constitution, or state case law.
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The

County is merely requesting the Court to formalize what already
exists, i.e., a public right to traverse the plaintiff's property
on the designated roadways.
There is no economic impact on plaintiffs' property.
Plaintiffs created the roadways, the public use in no way affects
plaintiffs continued use of their property as it was contemplated
and as it was used up to the point in time when the roadways
became dedicated.
The character and potential use of plaintiffs' property is
not altered by the roadways.

In fact, the roadways were and are

an integral part of plaintiffs' use of the property.
This case utterly fails the basic test applied in Colman v.
Utah State Land Board, to determine if a compensable "taking" has
occurred:
1.

The plaintiffs have no protected property interest,

because the road already exists for their own purposes.
2.

The character of the alleged government action is merely

to continue what has already been occurring.

There is no new

"government action".
3.

There is no economic impact on the property - in fact,

public maintenance of the roadway is a benefit to the landowners.
4.

The character and potential use of the property is not

changed - the road is already there.
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CONCLUSION
The claim of unconstitutionality is without merit.

DATED this

J$_ day of

^A^i.

1998

3fSW J. BUNDERSON
ATTORNEY FOR
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Bruce R. Baird
Attorney for Appellees
201 South Main Street, Suite 900
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Norman Johnson
Utah Attorney General's Office
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